The U.S. House of Representatives has passed a bill allowing the Biden administration to confiscate Russian assets held in American banks and transfer them to Ukraine, something the Kremlin has said would be illegal and trigger retaliation.

In response to Russia’s war in Ukraine, the United States and its allies prohibited transactions with Russia’s central bank and finance ministry and blocked about $300 billion of sovereign Russian assets in the West, most of which are in European not American financial institutions.

The Group of Seven (G7) major democracies is also looking at what it may be able to do around the frozen Russian assets.

Medvedev, a close ally of President Vladimir Putin and the deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, said on Saturday that Russia would not be able to retaliate in kind against any U.S. seizure of its reserves.

“The reason is clear – we do not have a significant amount of American state property, including money, rights and other US assets. Therefore, the answer can only be asymmetrical. It is not a fact that it will be any less painful,” Medvedev wrote on his official Telegram channel.

“We are talking about the foreclosure, for example by a court decision, on the property of private individuals located in the jurisdiction of Russia (money, real estate and movable property in kind, property rights).”

“Yes, this is a complex story, since these individuals usually acted as investors in the Russian economy,” Medvedev said. “And we guaranteed them the inviolability of their private property rights. But the unexpected happened – their state declared a hybrid war on us. This must be answered.”

He said the law in Russia would need to be changed to allow such asset seizures in favour of the Russian state.

Russian Central Bank governor Elvira Nabiullina said on Friday Moscow would defend its legitimate interests in the event that its assets were confiscated, but did not disclose the strategy and tactics.

Source: Reuters

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This weekend, Russian drones and scouts surveilling the front line just west of the ruins of Avdiivka, in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast, observed something strange. Ukrainian trenches just east of the village of Ocheretyne, previously manned by soldiers from the Ukrainian army’s elite 47th Mechanized Brigade, were empty.

The village was undefended

Seizing the opportunity, the Russian army’s 30th Motor Rifle Brigade raced several miles along the railroad threading west from Avdiivka and captured most of Ocheretyne—and potentially also Novobakhmutivka, the village south of Ocheretyne.

It’s the fastest penetration into Ukrainian territory by Russian forces in months—and it threatens to collapse Ukraine’s defensive line west of Avdiivka. A line that has held for months, but now has a deep and widening gap in it. “Pandora’s box is open,” Ukrainian analysis group Deep State commented.

To get a sense of how frightened Ukrainian commanders are right now, consider the brigade they rushed into the breach north and west of Ocheretyne: the 100th Mechanized Brigade. The brigade is one of the newest and most lightly-equipped brigades in the Ukrainian army—and seemingly unsuited for the kind of front-line triage commanders are asking of it.

The collapse in Ocheretyne reportedly isn’t the 47th Mechanized Brigade’s fault. That brigade—the main operator of Ukraine’s American-made armored vehicles—was following orders to withdraw from Ocheretyne in order to redeploy to the rear for a much-needed period of rest after spending nearly a year in combat.

The 115th Mechanized Brigade was supposed to take the 47th Mechanized Brigade’s place in Ocheretyne, seamlessly filling the same fighting positions with enough troops to maintain the integrity of the defensive line west of Avdiivka.

But something went wrong. According to Mykola Melnyk, the famed 47th Mechanized Brigade company commander who lost a leg during Ukraine’s counteroffensive last year, “certain units just fucked off.”

The 115th Mechanized Brigade’s failure to hold the line practically invited the Russian 30th Motor Rifle Brigade into Ocheretyne—and triggered a panicky response in Ukrainian headquarters. Commanders ordered the battle-weary 47th Mechanized Brigade to turn around and return to the front line. They also ordered the 100th Mechanized Brigade to counterattack.

The 100th Mechanized Brigade is a former territorial brigade—the equivalent of a U.S. Army National Guard unit—that the defense ministry in Kyiv upgraded to the active army in late March.

The 100th Mechanized Brigade isn’t inexperienced: its 2,000 or so troopers have seen action many times in Russia’s 26-month wider war on Ukraine. But the brigade lacks the heavy equipment—Western-made tanks, fighting vehicles and artillery—that gives more elite units such as the 47th Mechanized Brigade much of their combat power.

The 100th Mechanized Brigade fought hard, anyway, intercepting the Russian 30th Motor Rifle Brigade and other units from the Russian 41st Combined Arms Army as they attempted to advance toward the village of Prohres, another seven miles to the west along the same railroad linking Avdiivka to Ocheretyne. “The attempt to advance towards Prohres was stopped by a successful counterattack by the 100th Mechanized Brigade,” Deep State reported.

It’s unclear what might happen next in and around Ocheretyne. For now, Ukrainian troops “hold positions in the western part of the village and maintain fire control over its southern part,” the Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies noted.

That the Ukrainians had to rush into a combat a comparatively weak brigade speaks to the paucity of Ukraine’s reserves west of Avdiivka, however. The Russians, for their part, are keeping an entire tank division, the 90th, in reserve around Avdiivka.

If the 90th Tank Division rolls into Ocheretyne before the Ukrainian eastern command mobilizes additional reinforcements, the Russian penetration could widen into a full-fledged breakthrough—one that could force tens of thousands of Ukrainian troops to retreat west to their next line of defenses.

For the Ukrainians, the best reason to be hopeful is the $1 billion in fresh munitions the United States rushed to Ukraine in the hours after the U.S Congress finally, after six months of delay, approved additional U.S. aid to Ukraine on Tuesday.

The Ukrainian brigades around Ocheretyne will need every bullet, shell and missile they can get. Especially the lightly-equipped 100th Mechanized Brigade.

Source: Forbes

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Russian propagandists have published a recording of a “conversation between four senior German officers”. In it, they discuss the possible supply of Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine. The recording is authentic, the Bundeswehr has since confirmed. “This is a very serious matter and that is why it is now the subject of a very meticulous, in-depth and rapid investigation,” German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said.

On Friday afternoon, a half-hour recording of the conversation, which reportedly dates to Monday, Feb. 19, circulated on Russian propaganda channels. Margarita Simonyan, the head of Russia’s state broadcaster RT, then published the recording. She did not say how she obtained it.

It concerns a meeting that was held between Lieutenant General Ingo Gerhartz and three officers using the platform Webex for videoconferencing (!), writes ‘Die Welt’. During the conversation in Singapore, the four senior officers could be heard discussing the theoretical possibilities of deploying German Taurus missiles, apparently in preparation for a briefing to the German government. They talk about the challenges that a delivery of such missiles to Ukraine entails.

Scholz

The four officers do not assume that German soldiers should necessarily be sent to Ukraine for this. However, this is exactly what Chancellor Olaf Scholz has repeatedly used as a reason for not supplying Taurus missiles to Ukraine. According to him, Germany would thus be dragged into the conflict.

The officers also talk about the training of Ukrainian pilots and share technical details about missile systems. They also discuss several targets that the Ukrainians could attack with the Taurus – including ammunition depots and the Kerch Bridge (or Crimean Bridge), a key supply route for Russia-occupied Crimea.

What would make the publication of the recording even more painful for Berlin is that the participants in the call also discuss details about deliveries of Scalp long-range missiles by France and the United Kingdom.

“If this story is true, then this would be a highly problematic incident,” Konstanin van Notz, chairman of the parliamentary committee that monitors the secret services, told the newspapers of the RND group.

Singapore

It’s unclear how the Russians got the shot. One of the officers taking part in the interview is staying in a hotel in Singapore at the time. It is conceivable that he was bugged there, that his phone was compromised or that he dialed in via an unsecured Wi-Fi network.

Given that it was Russian propagandists who sent the audio recording into the ether, it seems obvious that Russian secret services are behind it.

German Chancellor Scholz promises quick clarification on the Russian publication of a recording of a conversation among German air force officers about support for Ukraine. “This is a very serious matter and that is why it is now the subject of a very meticulous, in-depth and rapid investigation,” he said after an audience with Pope Francis at the Vatican.

Damage Mitigation

The Bundeswehr tried to limit the damage on Friday by blocking accounts on X that distributed the recording in Germany.

The German Ministry of Defense is investigating whether the communications of the air force are being tapped by the Russians. “The German Military Counterintelligence Service (BAMAD) has initiated all necessary measures,” a ministry spokesman said.

The question of how secure the Bundeswehr’s internal communications are via unencrypted platforms such as Webex may be raised now that the audio recording has been found to be authentic. It is also possible that other communications were intercepted by the Russians.

The Russian Foreign Ministry had requested a statement from the German government, following the reports about the conversation. “Attempts to avoid answers will be interpreted as an admission of guilt,” said Maria Zakharova, the spokeswoman for the Russian ministry.

Source : DPG Media

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At the beginning of the ceremony, a minute’s silence was observed to pay respect to the memory of all the martyrs of the Great War of Liberation and to express sincere condolences to the families and friends of the victims of the tragic terrorist attack on Crocus City Hall in Moscow on March 22.

Twenty-six freedom fighters from different districts of Bangladesh were felicitated with commemorative gifts and certificates in the programme.

The freedom fighters expressed gratitude and thanks to the organizers for this honor.

In his welcome speech, the director of Russian House in Dhaka Pavel Dvoychenkov highlighted the historically friendly role of Russia in the great liberation war of Bangladesh and the overall development of post-war Bangladesh.

Land Minister Narayan Chandra Chand and the Director General of the Bangladesh National Museum Md. Kamruzzaman gratefully recalled the humanitarian and economic assistance in the reconstruction of war-torn Bangladesh, including the struggle for independence of Bangladesh.

They also said that the independence of Bangladesh would never have been possible without the cooperation of Russia.

Source: UNB

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Kiev is being bombed by the Russians, but despite the dangers the indiscriminate bombing brings, Ukrainians have their humor, and a bit of the “so what” attitude. 

Let’s call her Maria, because we don’t know her correct name and we don’t want to endanger the young coffee aficionado to targeted Russian attacks targeting the Ukrainian spirit of everything can be fixed with a good cup of coffee. 

The young Ukrainian barista keeps working despite today’s Russian missile strike destroying large parts of her cafe. “They won’t be able to break us,” Maria tells the reporter with a smile pouring the coffee in the morning. 

The front window was broken by the blast and the shop a bit in a mess, but Maria worked cheerfully away. 

Putin’s terror campaign against the civilian population becomes more and more like Hitler’s war machine. And if the Russians must waste a million-dollar missile for taking out a window of a coffee shop they become more desperate. 

Maria serves the cup of black gold with a smile. She goes about the business of geopolitics just with no worries. They can’t break us is their way of living. Slava Ukrainia. 

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This could present a boost for Ukrainian defense production amid ammunition shortages and dwindling supplies from the U.S.

“Ukraine is now an important partner for us, where we see a potential of between 2 and 3 billion euros ($2.18-$3.27 billion) per year,” Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger said during a presentation of the company’s 2023 results, the AFP wrote.

Previously, the company signed a contract with the Ukrainian Defense Industry (Ukroboronprom) in October 2023 to repair and produce armored vehicles directly in Ukraine in a joint plant.

During the Munich Security Conference in February, Papperger signed a memorandum of intent with Ukraine’s Strategic Industries Minister Oleksandr Kamyshin to produce artillery shells in another joint plant based in Ukraine.

Source: The Kyiv Independent

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Ukrainian officials are concerned that Russian advances could gain significant momentum by the summer unless their allies can increase the supply of ammunition, according to a person familiar with their analysis. 

Internal assessments of the situation on the battlefield from Kyiv are growing increasingly bleak as Ukrainian forces struggle to hold off Russian attacks while rationing the number of shells they can fire. 

Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said Thursday that mistakes by frontline commanders had compounded the problems facing Ukraine’s defense around Avdiivka, which was captured by Russian forces this month. Syrskyi said he’d sent in more troops and ammunition to bolster Ukrainian positions.

Pessimism among Ukraine and its allies has been mounting for weeks as they’ve seen Russian forces seize the initiative on the frontline with vital aid from the US held up in Congress. The fall of Avdiivka and several nearby villages is fueling fears that Kyiv’s defenses may not be able to hold.

Those losses should act as a wakeup call to Ukraine’s allies, a European official said.

“Ukraine can start losing the war this year,” Michael Kofman, a specialist on Russia and Ukraine at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said on the War on the Rocks podcast.

What many do not realize is a defeat in the Ukraine will cause western powers collapsing with calls for stronger leadership taking over. 

Russian President Vladimir Putin hasn’t given up his original goal of seizing major cities including the capital Kyiv and Odesa, according to Ukrainian intelligence assessments, the person said, asking for anonymity to discuss matters that aren’t public. 

If Russian forces reached Odesa, they would be able to shut off Ukraine’s crucial grain export routes through the Black Sea and open up access to Moldova, where the breakaway region of Transnistria on Wednesday appealed to Moscow for political support.

Depending on the results of the current campaign, Russia will decide whether to continue with a slow, grinding advance, or to accumulate resources for a bigger strike to break through Ukrainian lines this summer, the person close to Ukraine’s leadership said.

Putin on Thursday repeated that he still plans to achieve the goals set out at the start of the invasion, which have remained unchanged since 2022, during an address to his Federal Assembly.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said Sunday that munitions shortages are affecting the battlefield situation and warned that Russia is planning a new offensive in the spring or early summer.

“It will be difficult for us in the coming months because there are fluctuations in the US that have an impact on some countries, though the European Union showed it is capable of being a leader with its support,” Zelenskiy said.

With Ukrainian forces desperate for more ammunition, some allies, led by the Czech Republic, are looking into buying around 800,000 artillery shells from outside the EU to give to Ukraine.

A major offensive would still be a challenge for the Kremlin after two years of war that have depleted its forces. Russia’s efforts to take Kyiv, Kharkiv and move on Odesa in the early weeks of the war failed spectacularly.

Despite Ukraine’s shortages, Russia would need far more soldiers but also heavy tanks and vehicles to launch an offensive, Admiral Rob Bauer, NATO’s military committee chairman, said in an interview on Feb. 17. So far, Moscow hasn’t been able to ramp up production quickly enough in those areas, he said.

Putin “has more artillery, he has an ability to replace a certain amount of missiles every month, which he’s using, but he’s not been fully successful in terms of the increase in, for example, tanks and armored vehicles,” Bauer said.

He pointed to recent Ukrainian reports that, despite the loss of Avdiivka, Russian troops were killed at a high rate of seven for every soldier Kyiv lost.

“The one-to-seven ratio means he will need a lot of forces to defeat the Ukrainians, “Bauer said.

Ukraine’s strategy is to try to hold the front line as much as possible until the second half of the year, when it may get F-16 fighter jets and western ammunition production is due to ramp up. That would allow Kyiv to plan for another possible counteroffensive in 2025.

Aliaksandr Kudrytski and Jessica Loudis.

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Long before it was reported, at the end of January, that Volodymyr Zelensky had decided to replace his popular Army chief, Valery Zaluzhny, the Ukrainian counter-offensive of 2023 had devolved from attempted maneuvers to mutual recriminations. The arrows pointed in multiple directions: Zelensky seemed to think that his commander-in-chief was being defeatist; Zaluzhny, that his President was refusing to face facts. And there were arguments, too, between Ukraine and its allies. In a two-part investigation in the Washington Post, in early December, U.S. officials complained that Ukrainian generals did not follow their advice. They tried to attack in too many places; they were too cautious; and they waited too long to launch the operation. The Ukrainians, in turn, blamed the Americans. They delivered too few weapons and did so too late; they insisted on their tactics even when it was clear these were unsuitable for the terrain and the opponent; and they did all this from the comfort of Washington and Wiesbaden, rather than from the trenches, tree lines, and open fields where Ukrainian soldiers gave their lives.

The arguments were painful and significant. Was Zelensky right that, given the wobbliness of Western support, Ukraine had to keep up a brave face and the so-called military momentum, no matter the cost? Or was Zaluzhny right that a change of strategy and more troops were needed, no matter how unpopular these choices might be? The argument with the U.S. was significant, too. Was the failure of the counter-offensive, as the Americans argued, one of strategy or, as the Ukrainians counter-argued, one of equipment?

There was a third option: neither. The dominant factor was the Russian military. It was better than people had given it credit for, after its disastrous performance in the first year of the war. It was not demoralized, incompetent, or ill-equipped. Russian soldiers and their officers were fighting to the death. They had executed a brutal and effective defense and, despite all the losses they had incurred, they still had attack helicopters, drones, and mines. “People came to very strong conclusions based off the first month of the war,” Rob Lee, a former marine and an analyst of the Russian military at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, said. “And I think a lot of those conclusions were wrong.”

Being wrong about war can be disastrous, yet it is extremely common. The political scientist Stephen Biddle’s influential book, “Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle,” begins by listing a century of analytical mistakes. “In 1914,” he writes, “Europeans expected a short, decisive war of movement. None foresaw a nearly four-year trench stalemate—if they had, the war might never have happened. In 1940 Allied leaders were astonished by the Germans’ lightning victory over France. They had expected something closer to the trench warfare of 1914-18; even the victors were surprised.” Biddle goes on to describe the debate over the tank, deemed obsolete after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and then resurrected by its awesome performance in the Gulf War, in 1990 and 1991. Biddle’s book came out in 2004; since then, two major American wars, in Afghanistan and Iraq, have not gone as anyone had planned.

“It’s impossible, basically, to predict a future war,” Bettina Renz, an international-security professor at the University of Nottingham and an expert on the Russian military, said. “Most people who start a war think it will be over quickly. And, of course, nobody starts a war that they think they can’t win.”

Once a war ends, or even earlier, military historians begin to describe what happened and who was right. Some debates remain unsettled, because the war they theorize never takes place. A famous instance is a debate many years ago, on the pages of the journal International Security, over whether nato was adequately prepared for a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The political scientists John Mearsheimer and Barry Posen, having calculated the relative balance of forces, said that it was; the defense intellectual Eliot Cohen, who had worked in the Pentagon’s famous Office of Net Assessment, said that it was not. The debate stretched over several months, in 1988 and 1989. A short while later, the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

The war in Ukraine has led to more than its share of arguments. In the run-up, the U.S. spent months warning skeptical allies that an invasion was imminent. This argument was mirrored inside Ukraine: Zaluzhny became convinced that the Russians were coming, and spent the weeks before the war urging a mobilization; Zelensky remained uncertain, and resisted the advice, worried that it would panic the population and give Russia an excuse to invade. There was widespread consensus that, in the event of an invasion, Russia would quickly win. General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told congressional leaders in early February of 2022 that the Russian military might take Kyiv in as little as seventy-two hours.

When this did not happen, in part because Zaluzhny repositioned some of his forces without authorization and moved or camouflaged the country’s military hardware, a new round of arguments broke out. Was Russia a paper tiger, or did it simply fight in the stupidest possible way? Was China also overrated? Was the tank dead (again)?

Some of the figures in the argument were familiar: Eliot Cohen was back, urging the West to take a harder line with Russia (and China); so were Mearsheimer and Posen, counselling caution. (Mearsheimer sometimes went further, blaming the West for provoking the Russian bear and for violating the tenets of his books, which posit that great-power conflict is inevitable.) Both sides invoked Carl von Clausewitz, the nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist. Cohen cited Clausewitz’s observation that intangible “moral factors,” like the will to fight, are the most important thing in war; Cohen’s opponents held up Clausewitz’s arguments that defense always has the advantage, and also that war is the realm of contingency and chance. (“Clausewitz is like the Bible,” the American University international-relations scholar Joshua Rovner told me. “You can pull out parts of it to suit basically any argument.”)

Among analysts who had studied the Russian military and thought it would do much better than it did, there was some soul-searching. Russian units turned out to be shorthanded, and neither their cyberattacks nor their Air Force were as dominant as expected. The Ukrainian military had better cyber defenses than people realized, and they fought tenaciously. Importantly, they also had the full support of U.S. intelligence, which was able to tell them when and where Russian forces would try to land, and to help them prepare for it. But the biggest surprise was Vladimir Putin’s terrible war plan, which assumed that Ukrainians would not resist, and which he kept secret from his own Army until the eve of the invasion. “No one would have done a Ukraine war game that was set with the political and strategic starting conditions of the Ukraine conflict,” Scott Boston, a defense analyst at the rand Corporation who often “plays Russia” in the think tank’s war games, said. “You’d be kicked out of the room.”

So, was the Russian military as bad as it seemed, and would Russian lines collapse if subjected to a bit of pressure? Or was it a fundamentally competent military that had been given an impossible task? Boston said he kept thinking of the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, between Somali militants and American special forces, in which two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down and eighteen Americans were killed in a misbegotten snatch-and-grab mission inside the Somali capital: “You can take the best soldiers on the planet, and, if you throw them in a bad enough situation, it’s not going to go well.” Russian soldiers were not the best on the planet, but they were probably not as bad as they looked in that first month of the war, running out of gas for their tanks and asking locals for directions to Kyiv.

The very successful Ukrainian counter-offensive in the fall of 2022 presented evidence for both sides. In the Kharkiv region, thinly defended Russian lines collapsed when confronted with mobile Ukrainian units, allowing Ukraine to take back significant amounts of territory and cut off key Russian supply lines. But along the other axis of attack, in the city of Kherson, Russian forces held out for a long time and then made a large and orderly retreat, saving much manpower and matériel. The question became which army Ukraine would face in the summer and fall of 2023: the undermanned and demoralized one they saw in Kharkiv, or the organized and capable one they saw in Kherson?

The answer, unfortunately, turned out to be the latter. “The Russian military adapted,” Lee said. “They often require some painful lessons, but then they do adapt.” Lee agrees with some of the criticisms lobbed by both sides in the aftermath of the offensive. Strategically, he thinks the defense of Bakhmut was carried out for too long by Ukrainian forces, for political reasons; materially, he agrees that the West should have got its act together a little sooner to provide more advanced weaponry to the front. But, for him, these are secondary matters: “Most of it came down to the Russian side.” A failure to appreciate this was a major problem in U.S. discussions of the war. Dara Massicot, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told me that the emphasis on Russian incompetence in the first months of the war created unrealistic expectations and complacency. “The narratives that the Russian military is an incompetent clown car, incapable of learning, that they are about to collapse, and so on, are unhelpful and have done real damage,” Massicot said. “They have not collapsed. They’re still there. They have stood in the field and absorbed billions’ worth of Western weapons and aid over two years.”

In early November, the behind-the-scenes disagreements over Russian capabilities broke out into the open, in the form of an extraordinary essay by Zaluzhny and accompanying interview published in The Economist. Zaluzhny admitted that the counter-offensive had stalled and that the war was now in what he called a stalemate. He identified several factors—technological breakthroughs, achieving air superiority, improving electronic-warfare capabilities—that, he hoped, might move the war into a new phase. But Zaluzhny had lost faith in the idea that, by imposing devastating casualties on the invader, he would be able to take them out of the fight: “That was my mistake. Russia has lost at least 150,000 dead. In any other country such casualties would have stopped the war.” Zelensky, in turn, was frustrated that the commander-in-chief was making his views public—worsening an already tense relationship between the two.

Some analysts hope that the upcoming introduction of the American F-16 fighter to the Ukrainian side will change the course of the war. (Most predict that the F-16 will be helpful but not decisive.) Some believe that dropping a requirement that Western weaponry not be used to strike inside Russia could help. (Others, while agreeing, caution that deep strikes cannot be a substitute for conventional warfare; ultimately, Ukraine will have to take back territory in a ground offensive.) Many are concerned about the fact that Oleksandr Syrsky, Zelensky’s new choice for commander-in-chief, is the general who insisted on defending Bakhmut even after it became indefensible; they are even more concerned about the military-assistance package that is being held up in the U.S. Congress. But if, as Zaluzhny told The Economist, there will be no “deep and beautiful breakthrough,” what will happen instead?

The political-science literature on war duration (as opposed to war outcomes) is pretty clear: If a war is not over quickly, then it will last a long time. This is because incentives change. Blood and treasure have been expended. Society has been mobilized, the enemy vilified. People are angry. The war must go on.

There is a wrinkle to this story, however, when it comes to regime types. The standard work is “Democracies at War,” by Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, from 2002. Reiter and Stam argue, based on a slew of examples, that democracies have a better war-fighting record than autocracies. The reason is that they are better at fighting (the soldiers are more motivated) and that they start fewer dumb wars of choice. In a late chapter of the book, however, Reiter and Stam sound a cautionary note. For the same reason that democracies tend to start fewer wars, they tend to grow weary of them faster: “When the promised quick victory does not materialize . . . the people may reconsider their decision to consent to the war at hand and actively withdraw their support.” According to Reiter and Stam, this is the main reason that Harry Truman decided to drop two atomic bombs on Japanese cities in the summer of 1945. When wars drag on, democracies’ chances of victory diminish. In fact, Reiter and Stam write, “The longer a war continues, the more likely autocracies are to win.”

Putin has probably not read Chapter 7 of “Democracies at War,” but he has long been counting on the dynamics it describes. He has what he likes to think of as stability—he can decide on a policy and stick with it—whereas Western democracies are constantly changing their leaders and their minds. It was apparently his calculation, in the run-up to the war, that European voters would not long stand for the high energy prices that a war with Russia would entail; he believed, too, that the U.S. was preoccupied with its own difficulties and would not mount a sustained response. For nearly two years, he was wrong. Western democracies rallied to the side of Ukraine, and Russia seemed a lot less stable than Putin had supposed: a partial mobilization in the fall of 2022 was unpopular, and, in the summer of 2023, one of Putin’s longtime loyal oligarchs, Yevgeny Prigozhin, gathered a column of men and started marching toward Moscow. But Prigozhin was assassinated, and, in recent months, Putin’s expectations of Western disarray have finally begun to be met. Largely owing to Hungarian recalcitrance, the European Union took months to agree on a large aid package to Ukraine; more worrisome still, a group of Republicans has been able to stall a similarly large aid package in the U.S. Congress. And inside Ukraine, too, politics have reappeared. It is widely thought that Zelensky decided to remove Zaluzhny because he worried that Zaluzhny was becoming a political rival. (Zaluzhny’s public disagreements with his boss did not help.)

Hamas’s violent incursion into Israel on October 7th of last year, followed by Israel’s hugely disproportionate response, has scrambled the international map. It has also occupied the time of senior U.S. officials and weakened Joe Biden politically. Then there is this year’s U.S. Presidential election. The fact that, back in 2019, Donald Trump appeared to attempt to extort Zelensky—conditioning military aid on Ukraine’s willingness to investigate the Biden family—is not an encouraging sign for supporters of Ukraine. Neither is Trump’s long-standing skepticism of nato, expressed most recently in his comment that he would encourage Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to nato countries that did not “pay.”

Most military analysts believe that, in the coming year, even if U.S. aid finally comes through, Russia has the advantage. Russia has used continued revenues from the sale of oil and gas to pay for weapons manufacturing: it’s producing munitions, missiles, and tanks at rates double and triple what they were before the war. Though Ukrainian forces have driven drone innovation on the battlefield, Russia, over the past year, has produced more drones. And the state has managed, by hook and by crook, to continue recruiting men into the armed forces. “Let’s be honest,” Zaluzhny told The Economist, “it’s a feudal state where the cheapest resource is human life.”

Ukraine has some advantages. Western-supplied long-range missile systems possess precision and evasion capabilities that Russian missiles cannot match. These have allowed Ukraine to strike Russian airfields, barracks, and weapons depots well behind the front lines, including in Crimea; they have also helped Ukraine break the blockade of its Black Sea shipping lanes. Ukrainian soldiers have a better sense of what they’re fighting for, and the Army is the most respected institution in the country. Though Zaluzhny has been replaced, there is reason to believe that the reforms he’s been advocating, including a substantial increase in troop mobilization, will be carried out without him.

Military analysts are, however, a little hard-pressed to describe an actual military victory for Ukraine. Boston says he has not heard anyone discussing the equipment and firepower Ukraine would need. “Let’s say I want to have a breakthrough operation against Russian forces,” he said. “I need to have substantial artillery superiority at the point of the attack. I need to find a way to introduce land forces in sufficient numbers and have a way that they will not all get blown up by enemy artillery. The enemy artillery needs to be suppressed, needs to be destroyed, or needs to be blinded so that you can get enough of the land forces to punch the hole.” This needs to happen, furthermore, at multiple points, and Ukraine needs to have forces in reserve so that, if a breakthrough is achieved, those troops can take advantage of it. “That all, to me, sounds remarkably expensive,” Boston said. In a situation where a roughly base level of support is having trouble making it through a divided Congress, Boston found it hard to see a way toward an even greater level.

“Ukraine needs to prepare for a long war,” Olga Oliker, a former rand analyst and Pentagon staffer who is now the head of the Europe and Central Asia program at the International Crisis Group, told me. Oliker believes that a long war could be won, but it may not look like the victory some maximalists have been promising. “You have to create the space for Ukraine to claim victory under less-than-ideal conditions,” she said. “Because, if you say the only thing that is victory is the Russians go home entirely from Crimea and Donbas, Ukraine is in nato, and Moscow somehow disappears off the face of the earth—that’s an unrealistic goal. To me, Ukrainian victory is a situation in which Russia can’t do this again or at least is going to have a very hard time doing it again.”

This could mean that the Russian military is constrained by some agreement that it’s been forced into, but it could also mean that Ukraine’s defenses are sufficiently bolstered, and its allies sufficiently clear in their resolve, that the cost to Russia of a renewed offensive would simply be too high. There is also the hope, not entirely illusory, that Russian vulnerabilities will eventually become too much for the Putin regime to handle. “There’s a certain amount of instability that’s built into the Russian system that the Russians worry about,” Oliker said. “At some point, if they’re worried enough, they might be willing to negotiate.”

A senior Biden Administration official who has helped develop sanctions against Russia expounded on this theory. He said that, for some time, the Administration’s view has been that Russia can continue its current level of war expenditures into the spring of 2025, at which point it will run into trouble. He pointed to the freezing of Russian assets abroad, the running down of its hard-currency reserves, and the increasingly complex supply lines that Russia needs to evade Western sanctions. “It’s like a top that’s slowing down,” the official said. “They’re going to have to start making harder and harder choices, faster and faster, as we get into 2025. That’s a far cry from whatever Putin’s aim was in this war—which was, you know, reinstating Catherine the Great’s empire or something.”

The Administration official was painting an optimistic picture—one that depends on continued Western support. When I asked whether there was a contingency plan if the aid did not come through, he said there wasn’t one: “The contingency plan, frankly, is that the Ukrainians will keep fighting with less and less.” Ukraine is already running short of artillery shells, and it could eventually run out of air-defense interceptors. “So it’s a very stark choice in terms of the security assistance,” the official said. He estimated that, with the help of Western air-defense systems, Ukrainian forces could shoot down as many as ninety per cent of Russian air-attack assets. “Without it, that number will be zero soon.”

There is a third option for how the war might develop, beyond a “mutually hurting stalemate,” as it’s known in the literature, and a measured Ukrainian victory. As Michael Kofman, a longtime analyst of the Russian military who is now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, stressed to me, Ukraine could start to lose. That could mean a breakthrough by Russian forces, though they have so far been unable to achieve one, or just enough wearing down of Ukrainian and Western will that Ukraine is forced to negotiate concessions from a position of weakness. The question then becomes what, aside from the catastrophic humanitarian and political consequences in Ukraine, a Russian victory would mean for the world. If Putin wins, or feels like he has won, what will he do next?

Some argue that he would do nothing—that Ukraine is a special case, more central to Russia’s conception of itself as an imperial power than any other country. The counter-argument is that we don’t know. “In Moscow, they have all sorts of assessments of nato power,” Massicot said. “I don’t think they can confront it directly. For one thing, the Russian Army is partially destroyed. The Russian Air Force has not exactly covered themselves in glory in this war. But they will downgrade their assessment of nato as a cohesive alliance on the basis of our political will. From their point of view, they will feel that they have won a proxy war with nato. And they’re going to be angry, they’re going to want revenge, and now they think we’re weaker than we are. That’s a dangerous situation.” Right now, the U.S. has about a hundred thousand troops in Europe; in 1989, there were three times that many. An ambiguous result in Ukraine, which leaves Russia capable of further offensive action, could mean a movement toward old troop levels. And Mearsheimer, Posen, and Cohen would have to dust off their essays on nato preparedness.

It feels, in fact, like all the old Cold War arguments are back. Clearly, the Russian leadership is capable of brutal expansionist aggression. But just how far are they willing to go, and what exactly will they think of next? “The problem that I see is that the Russian economy has undergone a structural transition and is now on a militarized footing,” Kofman said. “So the Russian government is probably going to be focussed on regenerating military power for some time, both because it’s a matter of strategy but also because the militarized economy is going to be producing military goods and they will not have an easy way to transition it back.” This, Kofman concluded, means “that they could be in a position sooner than people think to actually contest the security and stability of Europe.”

Kofman, Lee, and Massicot recently published an article on the national-security Web site War on the Rocks in which they outlined a strategy for Ukrainian victory. “Hold, Build, and Strike,” they called it. In the essay, they urged Ukraine to hold the line of contact in the coming months, spend 2024 building up its forces, and then strike, in 2025, when they could see an advantage. These ideas were not far from what Zaluzhny had been advocating over the past several months. “You shouldn’t fight a war till your first failed offensive,” Kofman said. “That’s not how most conventional wars go. If that’s how they went, they’d all be over really fast.” He went on to give an example from the Second World War. “You know Stalin’s famous ten blows?” These were ten major offensives, several of them on Ukrainian territory, that the Soviets undertook against Germany in 1944. But there were, in fact, far more than ten offensives, Kofman said: “They just don’t include all the offensives that failed.” Last summer was a good opportunity for Ukraine to take back territory from the Russian Army, but it will not, Kofman believes, be the last such opportunity.

Oliker, whose job at the International Crisis Group is to seek ways to end conflicts, does not see how this one can end just yet. She admitted that, in the aftermath of the failed counter-offensive, in the midst of a long cold winter, and with Western support in doubt, Ukraine is facing a very difficult moment. “But it was not a good moment for Russia in spring and summer of 2022,” Oliker said. “That’s war. If it is, in fact, a long war, prepare for a few more back-and-forths.”

Source: The New Yorker

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The basic question was simple, Are We at War? Will Russia win? What’s the consequence for Europe if Russia wins? What is the European Union willingness to defend the Ukraine and willingness to mobilize Europe to go to war? If we are at war, then what is the strategy? How do we win?

The illustrious group agreed, if we are at war that than in cyber, we are at war. Cyberwars have no beginning and no end. Cyber has no boundary.

But besides cyber the war in the trenches continues, casualties on both sides are piling up. A culture of strategic exhaustion is adopted by both sides. This is neither new nor revolutionary. New is the tactical glass battlefield. Both sides see what the other side is planning. Deception does again become important. The killing becomes routine sort of a mechanical, tragic but a sideshow. We are at war.

Since we are now accepting war is the currency of today, what is the strategy for the near-term future? The lunch group conclusion is that four main strategies apply.

We Are At War!

Accepting Europeans facing a peer adversary with a history of violence, brutality, violations of human rights and disregard for the protection of culture and its humanity. The consequence of Russia beating the Ukraine is a strategic defeat for the European idea. The concept of war is abstract for Europeans. It’s bizarre. It is violent, destructive, and revolting to the senses. However, it must be done. As it was done to destroy the German war machine the Russian needs defeating. A war of attrition must be applied.

Beat Russia!

…and its allies near and far. Decisive and strategic. The strategy is simple. The objective out of textbooks. The attacker must be defeated. On all fronts. Wherever the Russians are a threat, the Russians must be defeated. The Russian nuclear fleet must be scuttled. The Airforce must be destroyed. Strategic commando operations must cripple the defense industry. No more hiding behind the Ural, out of reach. The Russian army is within reach!

The Ukrainian foreign minister said recently, ‘Every city, village, town the Ukrainian army surrenders is closer to your homes. Peace in Europe is over!’ The Russians must be beaten!

Russian Surrenders!

We except the surrender of the Russian forces. Unconditionally and immediate. A process of returning the territories occupied will be agreed on. A conditional process of surrendering of the war cabinet and incorporation of a peaceful transition will be initiated. Peace returns. But Russia must be defeated!

What’s Next?

The current conditions are closely watched by near peer rising challengers to the new hegemon, the European Union. The United States is largely a subservient client state of Europe and in the orbit of China, Turkey, with emerging Africa and states in Asia.

The United States are embroidered in an ideological dispute between the Republican and the Democratic parties for years to come. The political climate is a mouth service and serves the U.S. interest first and foremost. The newly rise of a new player on the scene is seen with mistrust within Washington power circles and Russians playbook operations. To off balance the distrust for Kyiv is bizarrely matched with Russian ambitions to bring the U.S. power circles closer to Moscow. If the Trump administration beliefs he brings ‘peace in our times’ he is mistaken.

However, the power brokers in Washington forget foreign relationships are born out of necessity rather than ambitions. Hence regardless of who is on the lever of power in the U.S. congress the long term relations with the Russian Federation are determined in a bilateral fashion.

We are on the verge of a multi-conflict ranging across Europe, embattling Asia, unhinging Africa. The evil forces may not be as evident as they are present, but the ideological battle is present. For years forces of moderation in the Islamic world gave lip services to the moderate European or American forces. Now a battle between good and evil is emerging.

by Marc Dubois

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“The EU must prepare for a future with more than 30 members through reforms,” Annalena Baerbock told a joint press conference alongside her counterpart Tanja Fajon in the Slovenian capital Ljubljana.

On the Israel-Palestine conflict in the Middle East, Baerbock said: “Only when the pain of one side is relieved, the pain of the other side can also be relieved.”

Fajon echoed her sentiments on a larger EU, calling expansion a “geostrategic necessity.”

The top Slovenian diplomat expressed hope that the EU will give important signals about expansion to the Western Balkans by the end of summer 2024.

Baerbock and Fajon also announced that they are planning a visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina together next summer.

The two top diplomats also attended a roundtable on EU enlargement in times of global crisis.

Baerbock visited the National Logistics Center in the city of Roje with Fajon, where she saw flood protection equipment and learned about the operation of the high-volume pumping unit, which is part of the EU’s civil protection mechanism.

During her visit, Baerbock is also set to meet with Prime Minister Robert Golob.

The EU’s last great expansion was before 2010, but the bloc has been keen to take in Western Balkans countries, in part to make sure they do not fall under the influence of other world powers.

Source: AA

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